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5

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HUMAN RELATIONS EDUCATION FOR
DEMOCRACY

or

A Professional Approach to Problems
of Human Conflict

ISSUE EDITOR'S FOREWORD

Richness through diversity, unity in purpose—these are the aims of the democratic society. In this issue of the JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY there are nine contributors from as many diverse fields. All have been associated in a common enterprise, the creation of a professional approach to the problems of democracy. The importance of this undertaking is matched by its vastness and complexity. How, then, is it possible to take hold of it in such a way as to clarify the goals and focus the effort?

We can see more clearly than men of any other time, perhaps, that the fate of the world hangs on the issue of how human conflicts are to be resolved, whether by the final appeal to force or to that of intelligence. We see this in part, because we are heirs to vast resources of knowledge as well as problems. Yet in the very richness of the sciences of man and the social vision of equal opportunity we have an additional problem. The tower of modern science resounds to the babel of many scientific tongues.

In this issue of the JOURNAL, the staff of the New York University Center for Human Relations Studies has attempted to set down some clarifying concepts which have grown out of their own and many other important efforts to relate training and research to social change. The first two papers, by a philosopher and an educator, have to do with a tentative formulation of over-all concept and of its implications for education, particularly teacher education.

The three papers which follow take up the questions of how far change toward democracy may go in the light of present knowledge of the individual, of the inertia of social institutions, and of the economic bases of anti-democratic social practices. In a swift mid-century review of the democratic balance sheet, the illustrations, and the bibliography, there are presented some inclusive generalizations and references. All authors acknowledge with gratitude the part that Ernestine Pannes, Executive Secretary of the Center, has played in the deliberations and working notes which were the well-springs of these papers.

No one more than the authors recognize the need for the expansion of what has been set forth. It may interest the reader to know that two forms of expansion are already planned. One will consist of illustration by reference to current practice—case examples—of the application of concepts here expressed. The other is a projected series of books which will deal with as many as a dozen aspects of theory and technology in human relations.

H. H. Giles

CONCEPTUALIZING HUMAN RELATIONS

Theodore Brameld

If human relations is to become a field of fruitful knowledge as well as effective action, one of the most important and difficult tasks to be confronted is that of conceptualization. There is need to formulate with maximum clarity and specificity the basic assumptions, objectives, and boundaries of the field, together with equally sharp analysis and clear synthesis of the subdivisions within it. Such an immense task cannot be accomplished quickly—certainly not in any form acceptable for all times and all places. Every person professionally concerned with human relations should share in the task at some point; he should agree that without such conceptualization, however imperfect, he cannot proceed very far either in theory *or* in practice.

At the present time the field of human relations is characterized by a wealth of materials, experiences, and enthusiasms on the part of thousands of individuals. This is wholesome, but also disturbing. The field has grown so rapidly that it has gotten, in a sense, ahead of itself. The result is a good deal of confusion, no little superficiality, a superabundance of verbiage, but relatively limited crystallization of fundamental techniques or principles. The time has come to begin that crystallization. A center for human relations studies is one of the places where effort should be made to bring form to a relatively formless mass.

Let us be clear that any steps taken toward this objective are not to be regarded as theory for the sake of theory. On the contrary, one of our major responsibilities is to provide a sound conceptual underpinning upon which we can expect to become successful in our applications. The

315

truism that American culture in general, and American education in particular, are impatient with theory—always zealous to "get going"—is a truism that cannot be challenged too often. It is because of our *practical* concern, then, that we urge patient and concerted attention to the kind of undertaking to which this discussion is a preface.

Three aspects of the total conceptual structure will be considered: I: the problem pivot of human relations; II: the interdependence of human relations; and III: the normative character of human relations.

I.

By the problem pivot we mean that human relations is a field of knowledge and action constructed for the purpose of coping with areas of misunderstanding, tension, prejudice, hatred, conflict. Throughout the world, human beings are suffering from their inability, thus far, to associate together in such ways as to produce individual and social harmony, appreciation of one another, group cooperation, and the pervasive feeling of well-being that stems from sound, healthful interpersonal and intercultural relations. The field we are now examining is a therapeutic field established, first of all, to correct this inability.

Implicit or explicit in the problem pivot is also the conviction that, however stubborn and chronic human strains and hostilities may be, they are potentially curable. They are curable, moreover, through one general conception before all others—namely, that of science. And science is essentially a *method*—a method applicable to the problems of men, in the same way that it is applicable to inanimate nature. True, the problems of men are still more baffling. As has often been pointed out, the world has utilized scientific method in the human sphere far less widely than in other spheres of nature. Where science masters with great success the giant powers in the earth below and the heavens above, it has by no means mastered the powers within and

between man.

Nevertheless, with all our continued superstitions, irrationalisms, and authoritarianisms, we are coming to recognize as never before, that the scientific method *must* be applied to human relations if human beings are not to destroy themselves. It is a foretoken of hope when the former Director General of UNESCO, Julian Huxley, could declare before that organization—the first worldwide organization of its kind—that the scientific spirit must become paramount among nations in dealing with race hatred, nationalism, war, and all other menaces to the continuance of civilization.

In pivoting human relations around its problems, what then do we do scientifically? The *first* stage, once we have become grossly aware of an area of conflict or tension, is refinement and diagnosis. Precisely as in analyzing a bodily illness, the physician of human relations needs to trace the history of the problem, to dissect causal factors, to seek connections between the focal illness and its environment—in short, to "track down" every symptom. It is an axiom of scientific method that the more thorough the diagnosis the more likely a successful hypothesis.

Any hypothesis which emerges from the diagnosis is, by definition, tentative. Therefore, the *second* main stage requires that we consider, as a rule, several hypotheses before deciding which of these is the most promising. Each time, moreover, that one is considered, the scientific method demands that we infer or anticipate what would happen *if* it were put into operation.

When we have rehearsed, imaginatively, the alternative suggestions for solving the problem, then and only then are we in a position to enter the *third* main stage—to try out one or another hypothesis. Meanwhile, we may, of course, find a need for further analysis, further refinement of the problem at any stage. But scientific method is never

complete until testing itself takes place. This is literally the decisive step. Without it we remain on a purely verbal level: there is a cessation of activity which can be justified in human relations even less, perhaps, than in the "problem approach" so widely heralded by progressive education.

These characteristics of scientific method are restated here, not because they are not already familiar, but because they provide, as it were, a measuring-stick for effective knowledge and action in human relations. When any stage is incomplete or missing, thus far is the field certain to be unsuccessful and fruitless in its efforts. That scientific method is always difficult to carry out, in no way lessens its crucial importance.

Illustrations of this generalization are endless. Sometimes they are much more dramatic, however, than at other times. They range all the way from tensions between two persons or within families, to violent conflicts between races or nations. In one instance, the effort to solve a problem involves a few children and perhaps a day or two. In other instances, it requires the combined efforts of hundreds of experts, vast expenditures of money, and decades of time. Nevertheless, the general character of the method prevails equally from one to the other extreme.

II.

Turning now to the second great aspect of conceptualization, our concern is to picture the field with special emphasis upon the second word of the term "human relations." In other words, it is the significance of the *relational* which distinguishes this field as much as any one feature that can be singled out for attention.

However obvious this may seem at first glance, the fact is that a genuinely relational approach to human problems is comparatively new. The conventional approach has been one of concern more with separate facts and discrete events—with parts rather than with relations of the parts.

Such atomization of experience is illustrated in various ways; in the divisions and subdivisons of knowledge about man, for example, and in the correlative specializations that have grown up within the human as well as the natural sciences. Not only are psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, politicists, economists and other scientists of man divided from one another; even within these separate fields, narrow expertness is typical. The main reason for this situation is, of course, the overwhelming breadth and depth of modern knowledge and, consequently, the inability of most individuals to become competent in more than a very limited sphere. This useful compartmentalization has carried over into education where schools are still so honeycombed with separate subject-matters that students seldom have anything but the haziest notions of how, if at all, the courses they pursue are connected with one another.

There is, however, a more basic reason for the traditional emphasis on piecemeal knowledge. This reason is cultural: to a large extent, the world since Renaissance has been an individualized world, at least until recently. The rise of capitalism as an acquisitive economy encouraged the belief and practice that the individual is the "be-all" and "end-all" of life—that success is a virtue to be measured by his capacity to compete with and win out over other individuals. Simultaneously, modern philosophy and science (with some exceptions) have rallied to the support of this atomistic outlook. The physical sciences have been constructed on the assumption that nature is made up of discrete particles. In the human sciences, too, the emphasis has often been on the separateness of experience: for example, psychology and psychiatry have stressed individual and subjective analysis of human behavior, and they have measured their data by quantitative techniques strikingly comparable to those of the physical sciences.

Beginning in the nineteenth and accelerating into the twentieth century, however, we have begun slowly to shift toward a more organic, interfused approach. Gestalt psychology is one example. The development of a theory of "field forces" in physics, the "unity of science" movement, the widespread criticism of over-specialization and compartmentalization, are other examples. In schooling, we see the relational emphasized in current trends toward "general education," and in efforts to integrate the curriculum. Philosophically, the organismic theory of man and nature developed by Alfred North Whitehead, the pragmatic conceptions of George Herbert Mead, and John Dewey, the earlier but still powerful impact of Hegel and Marx, are all symptomatic of the shift. A profound interest has arisen in the meaning and reality of the very term "relations." It is now widely agreed that relations between facts are just as real a manifestation of events as the facts related—indeed, that the latter would have no meaning except for their relations.

The field of human relations is a plausible consequence, therefore, of a number of trends. It challenges radically the splintering process in both knowledge and culture. It builds upon the assumption that human problems can be dealt with only in their total context. In scientific method this viewpoint is anticipated by the need for analysis which expresses the temporal relations (i.e., the history) of every problem, and of the spatial relations (i.e., the environmental forces) impinging upon every problem. Educationally, human relations is a graphic example of integrated learning, for it must deal with whatever aspects of the human and physical sciences, as well as of philosophy, the arts, and religion, that are relevant to a particular focus of concern. Both scientifically and educationally problems are usually attacked on a collective rather than individual basis; hence the promising new technique of group dynamics finds

RELATIONS OF WHOLE PEOPLES
RELATIONS OF "HOMOGENEOUS" COMMON-INTEREST GROUPS
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
Religion
PHILOSOPHY
ANTHROPOLOGY
Family Life
Sexes
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Race
PSYCHOLOGY
PSYCHIATRY
Child Development
SOCIOLOGY
Occupation
International
ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL LAW
POLITICAL SCIENCE
National

boundless opportunity for application in the field of human relations.

It follows that a center devoted to human relations studies cannot conceivably face its task without the close, continuous interpenetration of a whole cluster of areas. There are various ways of structuring these areas; we choose one for illustration. Let us conceive of the field as a series of three widening circles: (1) the center circle focuses upon the more interpersonal aspects, such as relations of the sexes, family life, and child development (the special concern, therefore, of sciences such as psychology and psy-

321

chiatry); (2) the next wider circle encompasses more or less "homogeneous" groups such as those distinguished by race, religion, occupation, or other common interests (the special concern of sociology, anthropology, economics, social psychology, etc.); and (3) the outer ring consists of the most all-embracing relations of whole peoples, both nationally and internationally (the special concern of political science, international law, philosophy, etc.). Each of the three rings is exemplified by other articles in this issue—the first especially by Giles and Rockwell; the second by Dodson and Weaver; the third by Embree.

Clearly these circles overlap, as again illustrated by the articles. Embree's and Giles', particularly, encompass all three rings. This is proper. For from an organic rather than atomistic viewpoint, there is continuous interplay between the kind of human relations of the center circle and those of the wider circles. Ideally, the aim should be to keep every phase of human relations, however personal or however worldwide, in fluid movement with other phases of the whole.

The need for specialists in anthropology, psychology, sociology, philosophy and other fields does not decrease within this framework. On the contrary, the need becomes more vital and necessary than ever before. But such specialists can no longer be sufficient unto themselves alone. They have the additional objective of serving both in terms of their particular competence, on the one hand, and of their bearing upon the total enterprise, on the other hand. As specialists of these kinds work together upon problems, isolation dissolves; they are distinguished both by colleagues and by students as partners who can speak a common language, who strive for common values, and who are concerned to act together upon the common problems confronting them. The group approach, discussed further in the articles by Giles and Dodson, is the primary approach.

Indeed, it is not too much to claim that the field of human relations sets a pattern for general education itself—and thus for the organization of secondary and college curricula. But it goes further in its potentialities than any of the programs of general education that have attracted recent attention. Not only does it build upon the assumption that learning is an organic experience, and that the inherited subject-matter structure is outmoded. It provides a fundamental and universal pattern for the kind of education so desperately needed in our kind of world by every young citizen regardless of who he may be or where he may live. It would eliminate the superficial "survey courses" that have typified too much general education so far. It would be motivated by the keenest and most intimate interests that people have. It would require the most thorough and penetrating analysis and experimentation that experts could provide. It would substitute, for the "child-centered" emphasis of earlier progressive education a "group-centered" and "community-centered" emphasis in which learning itself takes place by joint study and action.

In short, a human relations center can serve as a laboratory for testing the organismic conception of man-and-nature at virtually every point. As a model for eventually wider application, the more cross-sectional its faculty and, the more varied the backgrounds of its students, the richer are consequences of the laboratory for itself, for education in general, and for the community at large.

III.

The third and final aspect of our conceptual structure could just as well be first—indeed, *should* be first if gauged by its pervasive importance. For the success or failure of the field of human relations depends to an extraordinary extent upon the success or failure of the normative criteria that give form and meaning, as well as purpose, to each

element of the larger whole. It is in this respect, as much as any other, that a human relations center differs from conventional departments in the psychological and social sciences. Whereas the latter aim to be descriptive and objective in their methods and results, the field of human relations is also deliberately concerned with and guided by axiological principles—both ethical and esthetic.

Now it should be realized, of course, that no one philosophy of norms is possible. As a matter of fact, philosophies as antithetical as the communist or fascist would readily agree on the importance of human relations—provided they are allowed to define "importance" according to their predilections. Even in America, however, it would be misleading to contend that one philosophy alone is possible. Within the field as it now exists, one finds little difficulty in detecting deep-cutting differences, explicit or not, in the values and other beliefs by which workers carry on their programs and seek their objectives. One of the most urgent needs in approaching this final aspect is, therefore, that of facing frankly and honestly those "inarticulate major premises" already deeply influential upon human relations. This is particularly necessary in view of the fact that, as stated at the outset, conceptualization is a large and on-going task. Formulation of a sound philosophy of norms requires continuous sensitivity to alternative positions, both with the hope of learning from them, and for the purpose of guarding against their influence if and when it is discovered that certain qualities in their respective positions are unsatisfactory to us.

This is not to say that we cannot begin now to express the needed philosophy, nor that we should aim simply to maintain an eclectic attitude toward alternatives. We propose to be as forthright as possible in stating the minimum characteristics which we believe are already defensible and promising. Some of these are provided in the forego-

ing. The problem pivot and the scientific method, for example, indicate that the field of human relations should be governed by the assumption that man is capable of controlling his own life and meeting his own fate by developing his own strengths, and that scientific method broadly and socially conceived is the most important single instrument he possesses for demonstrating his power and capacity to rule himself exclusively.

Also indicated in our earlier discussion is the belief that human beings are united in various ways with one another, and that such unities are a fact, not only to be accepted but to be improved upon. Equally true is the fact that human beings are frequently *dis*united—that friction and conflict between individuals and groups are just as real as association and cooperation. While it is hoped that disunifying experiences may be reduced by the therapies of science, nevertheless it cannot be expected that differences between people will not continue. On the contrary, social health and vitality demand that they *should* continue.

The moment, however, that the term "should" is introduced, we are brought squarely before what may be called "the normative compulsion." The field of human relations is compelled to establish standards in the form of guiding purposes which serve as the beacon lights of every thought and every action. It cannot avoid doing so even though it chooses to do no more than accept uncritically the norms already implicit in the social heritage. The danger is that it will be satisfied with platitudes, or with pleasant-sounding generalities, such as "the dignity of personality" or "the brotherhood of man"—phrases probably more harmful than helpful because they conceal underlying differences of meaning at the same time that we pay lip-service to them. The normative framework now required should avoid cliches and undefined terms as much as possible. It should come to grips with the realities of a world shocked

by recurrent crises and revolution. It should seek to build a set of purposes commensurate with the mid-century, and with an age fraught both with terrible danger and unprecedented promise.

What, then, should be its direction? Two related features may be considered in addition to those already mentioned: (1) The needed philosophy should express a theory of values built out of the needs, wants, and interests of human beings as these are revealed by scientific study of the world's cultures. Utilizing anthropology and other social sciences, it should delineate these common denominators in order to determine the values that races, nationalities, religions, classes may hold together, as well as those which divide them. (2) The needed philosophy should attempt to establish by discussion and consensus those institutional patterns needed now and in the future in order that human beings may achieve utmost fulfillment of those values they possess most universally.

If we fuse both of these general requirements together we are saying merely that a normative conception of human relations should be seen, on the one side, from the point of view of the individual-social drives, habits, attitudes of human beings; and, on the other side, from that of such cultural arrangements as the family, industry, school, and state.

Can we suggest what each means more specifically? The first side of the normative coin would be constructed out of a conception of human nature, personal and communal, which sees man as good—and therefore as happy—when he is expressing himself as richly and fully as he is able. As against the negative, fearful, life-negating attitude toward social-self-expression that has characterized too many traditional philosophies and theologies (Calvinism is one of the most tragic examples), the position here affirmed proceeds from the major premise that the more

complete the release of one's energies, feelings, ideas, and the more generous the sharing of these with regard for others, the better human experience becomes. Ramifications of such a life-affirming philosophy are innumerable. They suggest, for example, that any barriers erected to keep people apart are inimical to the good life. Not only are racial restrictions to be condemned, but so likewise are class stratifications and the sovereignty of nations. Negative attitudes toward sex are immoral from this point of view; not only is rich sexual expression good, but efforts to place women in a subordinate position, to deny them equal opportunity for creative service, are totally indefensible. The implications of this norm for education are equally far-reaching: they condemn any kind of schooling which negates self-expression by children, or which refuses the full privileges of learning or training to any child or adult because of racial, religious, national, or economic status.

The institutional and sociological side of the normative coin requires the concerted formulation of cultural arrangements designed to provide such social-self-expression as we have just described. If this means the denunciation of certain institutions and practices, we must not shun the task. For example, we are required to reject nationalism in favor of a world union to which all nations belong, and in which there is complete freedom of communication and travel, as well as utilization of resources under the control of an international democratic government exclusively subject to the majority of the world's peoples.

Equally, a normative conception adequate to our age, requires an economic order based upon a much larger degree of cooperative enterprise. It repudiates practices which exploit many men for the benefit of few men, which fails to give women equal rights in every way, which denies the full resources of earth and industry to the common people, which perpetuates ignorance, disease and poverty.

This is only to say that a normative theory of human relations cannot be timid or vacillating. It requires concern with and commitment to political, economic and social goals just as concrete and magnetic as its psychological goals. Also it provides a large place for the arts, for it needs to be colored and infused with the esthetic and emotional along with the intellectual and scientific. Finally, the required norms should consider whatever ingredients of religious experience may be agreed upon as compatible with its scientific and naturalistic premise. This objective, admittedly very difficult to attain, requires intensive study of the history and psychology of the religions of the world, both for purposes of negative criticism and for purposes of incorporating such qualities of hope and reverence as seem essential to a philosophy of realizable expectation. Such qualities, we suspect, express a deep need in man for identification with a larger, more encompassing whole than he can find in his immediate and transitory surroundings. They may well take the form of a designed world culture, completely democratic, and dedicated, above all, to abundant self-expression for the masses of mankind.

But there must be provided simultaneously a dynamic of action by which the proposed purposes may be attained. This dynamic borrows much from scientific method. At the same time it involves political, economic and educational strategies capable both of overcoming the mountainous obstacles between us and the objective of a designed world culture, and of galvanizing the peoples of all races, religions and nationalities to unite powerfully and democratically in behalf of that objective.

Theodore Brameld is Professor of Education in the department of Philosophy and History of Education, and on the Staff of the Center for Human Relations Studies of New York University School of Education. He is widely known as a lecturer on social philosophy. Two books by him are scheduled for publication this spring. One is a collection of his articles and addresses, the other a book on patterns of educational philosophy.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SCHOOLS FOR DEMOCRACY

H. H. Giles

At the beginning of the Christian era, Tacitus remarked on the group process developed in a certain German village something like this: "When there is a question to be decided among them, they call every man to the meeting place. For two days they drink beer and discuss. On the third day they are sober and vote."

This is a description of shared decision—an essential of democracy. It is also a description of shared conviviality, which in 1950 we have come to recognize as a rapid road to free exchange of ideas and acquaintance (in American schools coffee takes the place of beer, due to the local customs). But the largest implication of all is not made explicit, namely, that leadership—whether the leadership of an idea or of a person with an idea, achieves its position through the trust, the feelings of kinship which can be developed.

In the rural south the present writer was most impressed with this fact. There it chanced, over and over again, that new ideas—to build a cooperative cannery or community sweet potato curing house, to form a farmers' union, to institute a community-problems curriculum, to think of another race as human—all these social changes were brought about through common councils by leadership in which those present had come to feel confidence through close and happy acquaintance.

Because there is no substitute for personal trust, it is idle to expect that the cold directive from constituted authority—whether a law, or an instruction sheet from the Superintendent of Schools, or an inert text book, or someone's prized mimeographed outline of a course of study,

329

can be a vital instrument of social change. Nor yet the most emphatic exhortation nor the dramatic self-selling of the revivalist. These are momentary in effect at the best. Nothing takes the place of personal acquaintance and trust in the agent of change.

This principle applies to the very process of group creation of ideas itself. Given a group in which each member knows the others well, there is yet a need to trust the process of group decision. This trust, as in all other cases, comes from personal experience. No fiat, no short-cut, will supply the essential requisites of time to get acquainted, time to try it out, time to arrive at conviction of good promise in the purposes and the methods of a proposal.

If these things be true, they only serve to illustrate that all social action, whether it be the daily conduct of family

relationships, the abolition of undemocratic segregation, or the institution of intercultural education, depends upon the kind of human relationships from which the action grows. Thus it is clear that an understanding of human dynamics and skill in good human relations practices are necessities to any successful educational process. But beyond this elemental fact, these understandings and skills are equally essential to democracy and education in it.

It has been said above that not the text but the teacher's treatment of children, not the directive but the administra-or's way of dealing with people, will determine their success. Yet either these are false notions, or professional education is a ponderous denial of them.

By and large the teaching of teachers and administrators is focussed on "content," on subject matter. Even the courses in "method" have to do primarily with means for "covering ground," explicating the text.

Courses in educational psychology too often are dull, too often have to do with a quantity of facts and theory regarding mechanisms of behavior, and too seldom take off from the problems encountered daily by students and teachers.

Further, it may happen—indeed, it often does—that the professor is a decent fellow and that some hint of his moral values creeps into his dealings with students. Yet even so, this is far from the goal of conscious, planned, thinking, experiment, and discussion of the basic factor in living and education—human relationships.

Now, assuming that all this is to be changed, what steps would be taken? How could it be brought about that the school and the schoolmaster become conscious, wise and skillful instruments of social change [1] rather than unwitting and ignorant tools of tradition and authority?

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[1] The school's hallowed function as the repository and torch-passer of cultural tradition is not to be ignored or forfeited. Yet it is assumed that when children learn anything, they create new patterns; when teachers pass on anything they transmute it (sometimes, alas, into baser metal).

To answer this question, the group contributing to this JOURNAL has undertaken much planning, experiment, evaluation and new exploration based on all three. The answer to be given presently is offered with the modesty which comes from awareness of the rich possibilities and from conviction of the magnitude of the task, and the primitive beginnings that are all that can be shown to date. In its essentials, the building of sound human relations education seems to comprise the following elements (dealt with by Brameld):

1. Definition and commitment to a social ideal — that of democracy.

2. Development of a philosophy of program.

3. Development of theory and practice through constant experiment and clinical analysis.

It is with the third of these that this paper is chiefly concerned.

THEORY:

Nothing is of more practical significance than the theory, the assumptions, the often unstated propositions to be proved by the practitioner. This is obvious to the teacher, social worker, or administrator who finds himself constantly faced with decisions, wishes to make them well, and therefore needs principles rather than rules to apply to the ever-varying nuances of human behavior.

In Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World,* there is set forth at some length the picture of education by "conditioning" and repetition. This education springs from a theory about why we act the way we do—Behaviorism. In many actual schools, this false and mechanical view of life is honored by rigid rules and regurgitative recitations which depend upon something called "habit formation" and which would more accurately be called "stultification and ossification of inquiry."

Other theories have other implications. For example, the Adlerian theory of the urge to dominate leads to interpretation of human motives as rebellion against authority. A Rank or a Rogers sees "will-to-creation," on the contrary, as central.

Many school staff members simply say of all that is comprised under theory of human dynamics: "You can't change human nature." The statement is true, *you* can't, but you can help the individual change it. And the implication that certain distressing tendencies to ill-behavior are born to be is, of course, nonsense. If nature were so fixed, we would be an animal, not a human society and there never would have been a Jesus, Gautama, Bach or Einstein.

It seems much the most valid, as well as the most challenging theory, is that which posits the centrality of growth and the urge to growth. It assumes an intense creativeness and the intelligence to deal with problems in all normal persons. In effect, then, it is observable that human beings grow, and desire to grow, to develop all their capacities. This is true so far as we know of *all* normal human beings in all societies. And it is equally true that *all* desire to belong, to have affection and recognition.

At once, when these basic elements are accepted as such, and when the field theory of a universe—of people as of energy—is conceived as "creative-emergent," the process of human relations education is off to a sound and a flying start. And, impressively enough, it is a process which identifies the goal of democracy—equal opportunity and freedom for the fullest development of all men—with the essential strivings of the person and the constant creative changes in the universe.

PRACTICE:

From such theory, and its development by use and test, comes the core task of good education and good relation-

ships. That task is to find the most effective, efficient means for releasing the full energies and exercising the full capacities of each person through a social discipline aimed at the cooperation of each in the endless process of securing the development of all others. The chief goods of a democratic society are the contributions, the mounting enrichment, which come from inclusion, as opposed to exclusion, from joy in "the different" as opposed to fear of it.

BLUEPRINT:

The introductory remarks above, are all very well, but they are meaningless until implemented. The best implementation must be that which is made by the group as artist—in a particular form for a particular time, place, personnel and problem. Thus we must beware of organizing a good idea in a way which will kill it, or at least clamp a cover upon its bloom and buds.

Yet we are trained to expect formulas and blueprints, and however false these may be if taken too seriously, their merit is great. They give us something to talk about, to try, and to improve on.

The blueprint for democratic human relations education may be drawn as one which has four dimensions. These are: scope, organization, content, and renewal through evaluation and new planning.

Where there are two persons, there are human relations problems to be solved well or ill, democratically or undemocratically. Even a solitary man on a desert island has his own, his human relations to the world. Therefore, *nihil humanum alienum est,* and, still more pertinently, *nihil inhumanum.* Tension and conflict which are destructive of man's full potential are our first concern, and through study and treatment of them we may come, as the medical man through attention to pathology, to a better understanding not only of how to restore health but of health itself.

Of all the tensions and conflicts we will do well to take those most urgent for our first attention. These comprise inner conflict as well as outer, for the understanding of self is a necessary prelude to the understanding of others, the tools with which each can work are insights as well as institutions and materials.

We will be concerned primarily with the most urgent destructive conflicts. We will also be concerned with those which are most strategic for our purpose. The self, Negro-white relations, religious divisiveness, social and economic class antagonisms are examples of conflicts of strategic importance.

We will narrow the focus, also, by beginning with dis-functions in working groups to which we belong. The place of greatest possibility is in our own backyards, where we daily exercise some control, play some meaningful part. And, in a larger sense, we will work thus through institutions—the family, the social agency, the school, government, etc. These institutions offer organizational structure and continuity. They involve a group approach which has special advantages in bringing about change involving great numbers of people through better means than the well-meant appeal to the heart of each man without immediate opportunity to put conviction into practice and be sustained by belonging.

We will work, educationally, not by force.

Still more specifically—

We will establish as central in schools of education the examination and practice of human relations education

1. Through joint purpose, jointly arrived at
2. Through joint planning
3. Through joint work
4. Through joint evaluation.

Since purpose is democratic, it will search out activities of most benefit to all. It will lead to immediate action. Staff

and students will undertake projects in school and community, finding the urgent problems, trying their solution. Staff and students will examine their practices clinically—what works and why? What doesn't work and why? Staff and students will extend their clinical questions, their unsolved problems into the setting up of propositions to be tested by research, and will test them. Staff and students will draw from all the human sciences the principles and data which seem most valuable to employ. Staff and students will translate their findings to others, sharing their wisdom and detailing ignorance so that it can be reduced.

This can happen in all teachers colleges, in all schools, in all families, in all social agencies, in government, in all institutions of living. Its precise form must grow from the working group itself.

What is described, is a process of endless search and endless development of personality through devotion to the ideal of maximum growth of all. It will require, and once glimpsed, will attract, the boundless devotion and energy which can transform hostility into curiosity, competition into cooperation, ignorance into understanding, and a narrowing into a freeing society.

If this be done, it shall be done by all men in the interest of each man. It shall be done by ways of which we now see only the beginning. It shall be done by infinite acts of creation and not by unthinking rule.

H. H. Giles is Professor of Education and Director, Center for Human Relations Studies, New York University School of Education. He has had wide experience as teacher, consultant and administrator, and has done social work in three cities. His books and articles on general and intercultural education have been used by both lay and professional groups.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE HUMAN ORGANISM

John Rockwell

Some years ago I was in one of the wild rice camps of the Chippewa Indians of Minnesota. An Indian had introduced an ingenious variation in the parching of the rice. He had attached an oil barrel to the axle of a Model T car. This rotated over a fire. The result was a speedy and effective method of drying the rice. Not only was the parching process handled quicker, but the rice was superior in quality. The grains were whole and not shattered as was common under the old method.

Here was a new tool which I have no doubt is still used and will continue to be used until a better process is devised. Instances such as this are numerous in all groups of people. The ease with which people will adopt a new tool is proverbial. Tools and their adoption seem to transcend tribal and cultural boundaries with little difficulty. Has any group, once its people have learned the principle of the wheel, given it up? Even among people differing radically in their social values, there is a common acceptance of mechanical devices. Group animosities seldom extend to instruments.

We sometimes speak of static cultures. thereby implying little or no change. At times we even deplore the lethargy in our own culture and call attention to the fact that the values incorporated in our institutions need reevaluation and change. Or again we bolster our faith by taking refuge in such highly uncritical terms as "human nature," forgetting that human nature is seldom the automatic expression of original nature uninfluenced by experience and learning.

In the contrasting behavior of people toward tools and the values inherent in their institutions certain things

337

emerge that need examination. Why is it, one may ask, that people do not show the same resistance toward the adoption of a new tool that they display in many other areas of inter-person and inter-group relations? Is it because the utility of the tool is so easily recognized? Or is it because it is hard to personalize tools in terms of language? A tool is a thing, subject, in the thinking of the user, to his own mastery. It, therefore, seems to be more remote from the area of inter-person or inter-group relations. No complex language is needed to describe its purpose. Its value does not need to be defended, because all can recognize clearly its utility. It is accepted with ease and with little of the elaborate ritualization that characterizes a congealed social habit or prejudice.

But in the field of values—and back of all institutions are bodies of clearly articulated values—there seems to be little of the flexibility that people manifest toward the adoption and use of mechanical instruments. Here real lethargy is often displayed toward change although change might be clearly indicated. A racial prejudice can, for instance, persist for long periods of time even in the presence of obvious disadvantage to a large part of the group.

Strange to say this cultural lag or resistance is quite as characteristic of the ultra-radical as it is of the ultra-conservative. The conservative wants no fundamental change; social institutions, in his thinking, satisfy his needs. Change would be disturbing and inconvenient. The radical on the other hand wants drastic change in the social institutions. He is willing to scrap the old institutions and values and substitute the new ones of his particular cult or "ism". However, where this has been done he in turn becomes ultra-conservative in the new order. He welcomes few changes in the values of the new social order. He deals harshly with any individual who deviates from the new pattern. And he is willing to go to extreme lengths—even

to the distortion of truth—to articulate values that quickly acquire ritualistic expression and that all members of the group must overtly adhere to. With both the conservative and the radical change is not sought when a position of power is once attained. Both, seemingly, place their emphasis upon value absolutes. Both also violate certain facts about human behavior that must be seriously considered in any careful examination of man in relation to his environment, both physical and personal.

It is trite to call attention to the fact that human behavior is never a constant. Variability seems to be a fundamental law of the universe. The expression of that principle is everywhere apparent. Modified behavior expresses itself in clinical medical pathology, in the often unnoticed adjustments necessary to maintain what Cannon calls "homeostasis"—a state of equilibrium—, and particularly in the degree to which man, through that remarkable process memory, can retain impressions of experience and bring them to bear upon the solution of new problems. Constants, in so far as they exist, seem to be merely states of quies-

339

cence, in which no primary problem disturbs the individual.

The external and internal world, or environment, of cells is a constantly changing one. And what applies to particular cells applies to the organism as a whole. Individually and collectively cells undergo modification in their need for adjustment, or else they carry within themselves, or the mechanisms which control them, a far greater range for variable performance than is sometimes suspected. Seven-eighths of the pancreas of a dog can be removed without a resulting diabetes; the heart, under emergency, can carry eight times its usual load without a resulting pathology; the kidney can secrete upward of twelve times its usual amount of water. These are but a few of the functional variations that characterize most tissues of the living organism. The dynamics of the living organism seem to rest upon mechanisms capable of great variation. There are limits, of course, through which the potential behavior may vary, but those limits are not as confined as many people imply in the loose use of such a word as "human nature," or in the static implications in "isms" of various groups.

Biology, Sociology and Psychology offer numerous examples of adjustment mechanisms, or behavior variation potential. Many, perhaps most, have great utility value. If one goes from a low to a high altitude there is a rapid increase in red blood cells, the oxygen carriers. Heat has been shown to be effective in producing modification in the fruit fly or to bring out characteristics that do not ordinarily appear. Transplants in some species are possible, at least up to a certain stage in embryological development. If liver tissue is transplanted to a remote area it does not become liver tissue but takes on the character of its surrounding tissue. Transplanting the optic cup results in the differentiation of the neighboring skin into a lens. Sex reversal is possible, at least as regards the secondary sex

characteristics. The X-ray can be used to produce monstrosities, thus indicating gene variation or annihilation. Diphtheria germs grown in a protein medium possess more virulent and deadly qualities than those grown in a carbohydrate medium.

As with Biology, so in Sociology and Psychology there exists much content to indicate that the organism is not static, that it does not perform with statistical prediction accuracy. In both of these fields the extensive use of statistical procedures is necessary because observation and experimental approaches are never so accurate that all the variables operating can be controlled. Such a condition introduces error. The experimentalist protects himself against rash over-generalization of data through the use of statistical measures which give him some measure of the degree to which his observations exceed those of mere chance observations.

But it is in the field of learning that the Sociologist and Psychologist have contributed much to the understanding of this broad principle of biological design, variation. Let us conceive if we can what life would be like were it not for the fact that, intrinsic in the dynamics of the living organism, is the capacity to retain impressions of experience and to utilize experience in meeting new problems. Without the capacity to learn there would be no art, no science, no social organization, no values, and no capacity to meet new situations, except in so far as we could vary our reflex mechanisms. Life would be lived, if at all, on a low order of reflex activity. Movement and activity would be greatly restricted. The great variations in the environment, such as climatic variations, would exert a tremendous toll in life. It is hardly conceivable that any organism could survive. Certainly if survival were at all possible, we would not be talking or writing about it. Writing and talking are made possible only through an elaborate learning process

that man alone seems to have the capacity to exercise. The differentiation of the hand and the larynx through the process of evolution has made possible the attributes of speech and writing. But along with that differentiation went another of equal importance. The evolution of the brain, through its increasing complexity and functional flexibility, permitted the activity of learning to become a highly significant function of the organism in its efforts to adjust in a hostile universe. Perception, judgment, imagination, personality, even such things as fears are highly, if not almost completely, conditioned by the activity of learning. Pavlov has shown that even such primary native mechanisms as reflexes can be conditioned, a learning process!

But learning can also make for stability. In fact that seems to be its primary purpose. When the old mode of conduct is not adequate to meet the demands of a new situation learning takes place and remains to function as habit until new and other conditions again force a change. Dogma utilizes this fact extensively. It is strengthened immeasurably by the fact that anything that disturbs the state of rest or quiescence compels adjustment, and adjustment is not always easy or pleasant. Such factors are at the base of social lethargy and resistance to change.

Space does not permit an enlargement of this topic. But one other thing needs to be mentioned. It is common—probably because it is easy—to frequently make a distinction between intellect and emotion, as if a real dichotomy exists and they were two quite entirely separate things. It is doubtful whether any really good defense could be made for such a distinction. Rather, it would be more nearly correct to assume that they are both aspects of the adjustment process and that they are inextricably bound up—together with numerous other physical-chemical adjustment mechanisms within the organism—in all types of adjust-

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
ments that cannot be met quickly and easily by reflex action. Does anyone ever think or believe without feeling? Does not action, at least as regards any novel situation, demand attention and new modes of procedure? Is learning ever accomplished without motivation and is motivation ever free from feeling, emotion if you will?

As with the dichotomy between intellect and emotion, so one meets confusion in the use of such words as the "self", "ego", etc. Some users almost imply that they are entities, not too much different from the concept of "soul". Might it not be said, and with greater force, that the "self", the "ego", etc., are merely the memory residues of past reactions, inter-person reactions and otherwise? If we had not the capacity to adjust to new situations—usually by glandular and muscular adjustments—and to retain through memory the impressions of those reactions, it is doubtful we would have any concept of self.

But what relation does all this have to social change? Social change can be and will be undertaken whenever enough people find that present conditions do not meet their needs. They may be retarded in the accomplishment of change by habits of thought—dogma—that certain groups find advantageous to cultivate in others. In this the

343

extreme radical is to be mistrusted as much as the extreme conservative. Both pin their faith upon institutions which, once initiated, must proceed with little change.

Such a position is not in harmony with the organization principles of living tissue. Within the amazingly complex and mysterious mechanism, a human being, vast powers for adjustment reside. Not only that, every individual differs from every other individual by native inheritance and by the experiences he has encountered. These two conditions make every individual truly unique. That such unique individuals have been able to accomplish in the process of time this complex achievement that we call civilization, is a testimonial to man's flexibility and capacity to learn. The greatest single danger which confronts him are his own self-imposed restrictions, his resistance to giving up old habits and his unwillingness to try new modes of behavior.

Upon the shoulders of the people who articulate our values, be they churchmen, politicians or educators, rests the heavy weight of being the initiators or retarders of action. Irrespective of the role they play, nature has provided lavishly for variable performance. Is it not possible that in this variable performance from person to person and within the same person, bolstered by and unified through man's remarkable ability to learn, there is suggested that type of social organization most likely to meet man's needs? The question is forced whether that type of social organization that permits people easy access to facts and the opportunity to exercise choice in relation to them is not the only one that can articulate values and insure social ordering compatible with man's original nature.

John Rockwell is Professor in the Department of Educational Psychology at New York University and a staff member of the Center for Human Relations Studies. He taught at the University of Minnesota for several years, was Commissioner of Education in Minnesota and served for several years in the Indian Service.

SOCIAL ACTION AND EDUCATION

Dan W. Dodson

Perhaps one of the most promising aspects of the emerging field of human relations is the inclusion of programs of social action to complement those of education. In the 1920's George S. Counts was writing on "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?" There was much discussion as to whether or not education possessed the dynamic with which to move the social process. Obviously there were many conflicting points of view. Some believed that education was so completely in the hands of vested interests which represent the *status quo* that it was sterile so far as social change was concerned. Many good people left the teaching profession, or else were not attracted to it in the beginning, because of the lack of faith in education as a social force. This author recalls in some of his graduate work the impatience of graduate students in discussing social problems because the professors seemed contented to discuss them as "problems" rather than concern themselves with the techniques for solution. I recall that one of the professors always said, "When you have studied a problem and understood it, you have done something about it." With Sumner as their Bible, these professors of yesteryear—as well as many of their colleagues of today—dwelt at length upon the necessity of remaining "objective" and were careful to point out how "you can't get ahead of the mores."

This pattern of thought in the education world drew a dichotomy between social action and education. Perhaps its illustration is represented in the life of W. E. B. DuBois.* He started his career as a social scientist who felt that an annual compendium of research on the "Negro" would be the fastest method of improving Negro-white re-

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* Dusk of Dawn.

345

lations. One year in Atlanta, however, while on the way downtown, he met a Negro running the opposite direction who cried, "For God's sake, don't go down there. They killed a Negro, cut off his hand and have it displayed in a store window." The sensitivity of DuBois' soul was so disturbed that he wrote, LITANY OF ATLANTA and after the Niagra Conference, came to New York City to head the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In DuBois' thinking as well as the thinking of the educational fraternity as a whole at that time, social action and education were two completely different things.

Today we realize that there is no dichotomy between social action and education. The one is a necessary complement to the other. For a long time, Educational Sociology leadership has contended that education had not taken place until behavior was changed. The criteria of health education, for instance, must be the improvement of health in the community. The criteria of the effectiveness of programs in human relations is not to be measured in the bales of literature produced, the speeches made, or even the development of "conflict-free ritualized" relations between children in school, but rather in the improvement of intergroup relations in the social milieu in which people function, namely the community.

In order to accomplish this change of patterns of community life, it is not sufficient to change individual's attitudes. There must be a concern with the change of the group and institutional structure through which prejudices and cleavages are channeled. There is considerable evidence to indicate that the production of social change today depends less upon attitudes of individuals than upon moving the position of social institutions. If documentation of this point is needed one has only to look at the way in which the peoples of the world are pleading for peace and note the difficulty of moving the position of the institutions

of government in that direction. Yet the major emphasis
on peace education is focused toward changing individual's
attitudes. The one thing we learned about integration as a
result of the war, was that where management at the top
took a firm, positive stand there was no difficulty in in-
tegrating Negroes and whites. In public housing in New
York City some one hundred thousand families are living
in peace and harmony on a completely integrated basis be-
cause management, which was public, took the position
from the beginning that this is "public housing" and being
public, it is open to whoever qualifies, irrespective of race,
creed, or color. In the four and one-half years during which
I was Executive Director of the Mayor's Committee on
Unity, there were not more than two evictions growing
out of disputes between people of different ethnic back-
grounds and neither of these disputes had its origin in eth-
nic differences. The institutional position in the community,
unlike the individual's position—except where the individ-
ual is clotured within the vestments of an institutional
office—represents vested interests and usually represents
the *status quo.* There is no formula yet known to this
author where vested interests give up their preferred po-
sition without resistence. We have not learned Joshua's
technique of bringing down the walls of Jericho by blowing
the horn.

The foregoing statements have not been made to depre-
ciate the role of education as a cultural dynamic. It is ob-
vious that when behaviors are changed, people are edu-
cated. The emphasis has been, however, designed to place
social action as a necessary complement to education and
in many respects, scarcely distinguishable from it.

TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL ACTION

An assessment of the techniques of social action is diffi-
cult to make at the present time. A few suggestions, how-
ever, will suffice to indicate the directions in which it is
important in human relations.

(1) Action Through Involvement

With the rapid development of the field of group dynamics, considerable technology is being designed to produce social change by involving those who represent the interests which must be changed in a *social process*. There are varying degrees of effectiveness of such a procedure. Consideration is needed to know which levels of intergroup conflict can be changed and which cannot through such a process. It is the author's opinion that types of conflict in the realm of values *per se* can be changed much more rapidly by this procedure than those which involve giving up vested interests. The social technician also faces the problem of whether he is using the processes or whether *he* is being used by forces which wish to use the process as a stall. One of the finer points of judgment in the field of social action is, undoubtedly, that of deciding when or to what extent to "trust the process." The *involvement-in-process* approach is rapidly slanting education toward community-school programs in which the dichotomy between the school (in the sense of scholastics) and community is being erased. At the Center for Human Relations Studies, we are undertaking a project in cooperation with the Board of Education of New York City in which we are working in the community and in the school without too clear lines of demarcation as to where one begins and the other ends. This approach is based on the assumption that it would be impossible to move the school without moving the community and *vice versa*.

(2) The Pressure Group Technique

There are times when it is clear that the social technician cannot trust the process. In these instances to bother with involvement would represent a waste of time. Thus there is no alternative but to resort to the "soap box" or whatever means are available to change institutional patterns. In some respects, of course, this represents a nega-

tive approach to communal well-being. It is unfortunate that to this point we have no panacea, particularly in the larger communities, for bad government except "vote and throw the rascals out." Agencies of government as well as other institutional structures know this public apathy well. As a consequence, they are particularly sensitive to pressure group technique. There is scarcely a larger community but that the average citizen would come nearer getting change effected by knowing the pressure groups in the community than by the merits of his program—this includes the school.

At this point the technician must weigh in the balance the outcome of the long and short range effect of his action. Indeed, in the immediate and short run there is a heightening of tension as groups clash over differences. The ultimate assessment must be in terms of whether the broken barriers make up for such increase in group consciousness. When the Mayor's Committee on Unity started the fight against discrimination in colleges and universities in New York State, we faced frankly the possibility that the agitation and discussion would create greater a consciousness of who were Jews, Negroes, etc., and who were not, than had been true before. But it was clear that we were fighting a losing battle and that the quotas were becoming more rigid instead of flexible, hence the decision to make a fight of it. This has been undoubtedly true in many of the legislative cases which the NAACP has won against the South—cases which have made great advances in intergroup relations.

(3) Legislation and Legal Action

Fortunately the people of the country had heard little of Sumner and the mores and differed from the social scientist as to what could be accomplished through legislation. It is now clear that legislation and legal action can be some of the most formidable tools in social change. It may be true that attitudes cannot be changed by law, but it is be-

ing increasingly demonstrated, as indicated above, that the change of institutional policies and regulation of institutional practice (things which *can* be changed by law) goes a long way in by-passing the bias of individuals. Thus, the attitude of the employer is not so important if his institution cannot discriminate in its employment practices. Furthermore, by breaking the barriers to integration, individuals are brought together on an unselfconscious basis so that they have an opportunity to know each other in roles different from group stereotypes. Perhaps the most important facet of legislation is the fact that there is "public definition of policy" as a guide, not only to one institution, but to all the institutions in the community. As I indicated in the article on "Religious Prejudice in American Colleges," * no college felt that it could afford to remove the barriers to minority groups alone, but with public definition of policy on admission practices, all the institutions in the state were able to bring their policies in line at the same time and the fears of none were kindled. Another significant illustration of this pattern is demonstrated in New Jersey. Over a long period of years with all of the education, preaching, pleading, hoping, praying and trusting, the segregation of Negroes and whites in the public schools was becoming increasingly evident. It was when the position of the social institutions of public education were changed through the development of the new state constitution and legislation, that segregation started on its way out. This is not to say that education did not have its effect nor to depreciate its value, but it is to say that in the last analysis the job is not completed nor significantly improved in most cases until the institutional patterns are changed.

It should be clear from these suggested aspects of social action that fruitful approaches to human relations are being developed by forging of new conceptions of the func-

* *American Mercury*, July 1946.

tion of education and not the least significant of the new conceptions is the closing of the gap between education *per se* and social action.

Dan W. Dodson, Editor of the Journal of Educational Sociology, is professor in the Department of Educational Sociology and Director of Curriculum and Research at the Center for Human Relations Studies at New York University. From 1944 to 1947 he was on leave from the University, serving as executive director of the Committee on Unity, created under the administration of Mayor LaGuardia and since continued.

RELATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE TO THE ECONOMIC BASES OF SOCIETY

Robert C. Weaver

I.

Despite the current vogue of psychological approaches to human relations—most recently expressed by the definition of the minority problem in the United States as one of hatred—almost all students admit that economic interests, institutions and conditions influence behavior. The real issue is one of degree. There are those who find the key to total understanding in economics; others minimize the economic factors. Emphasis upon these latter factors here is not an acceptance of a dogmatic economic interpretation of history, which asserts that men are, consciously or unconsciously, actuated primarily by economic motives only. My purpose is to discuss economic factors while admitting that there is no single, all-important cause of human behavior or basis for human values.

In approching this problem, I shall lean heavily upon Negro-white relations in the United States, since this phase of human relations dramatically illustrates the principles I wish to set forth. In this frame of reference, the rise, perpetuation and spread of the color line will be out-

lined. Then, the implications of a mobile, middle-class society for human relations will be outlined; and, finally, the role of power relationships in social change will be discussed.

II.

Because the vast majority of whites in the South never owned any slaves, the few who had a special interest in perpetuating slavery found it necessary to develop means of identifying their obvious interests with those of a much wider segment of the population. This was accomplished by introducing and popularizing the concept of the inherent superiority of all whites and establishing a color line to symbolize and assure its manifestation.

By a process of manipulation and propaganda, the poor whites' hatred of the plantation system was transferred to a hatred of their fellow victims of it—the Negro slaves. And this did not appear clearly until human slavery had become extremely profitable and firmly established in the South. The working people of the region, who ultimately became the most vocal supporters of the color line, did not stress race until guided in that direction by the economic control groups in the area. The masses became transmission belts once the society had been conditioned for the development; slavery and the plantation system created economic insecurity for all who remained outside their direct influence.

In the North, arrival of large segments of immigrants created a somewhat similar situation. As the composition of the newcomers from Europe shifted from groups which were highly skilled to those which had no special skills, competition for unskilled work increased with the result that wages were adversely affected and unemployment mounted. Again, as in the plantation South, animosities and hatreds were evidenced in the working classes that had the least security and social position. These feelings

were, in fact, expression of resentment against insecurity —a feature of the economy that affected the unskilled with peculiar severity and the nature of which was adroitly concealed as workers accepted employers' emphasis upon ethnic differences. The fact that intergroup hatreds and conflicts in the North often had the latest white migrant groups as the scapegoat reflects the economic basis of the animosity. There was, of course, one fundamental difference in the immigrants' status. They had never been in bondage in the New World, nor did they have the badge of color which served to differentiate the Negro and remind others of his previous conditions of servitude and the disruptive consequences of slavery.

After the Civil War, the color occupational system which developed perpetuated the concept of the Negro as an inferior being at the same time that it established institutions to assure his inferior status. It served to conceal the basic nature of economic problems and colored them with racial situations. This, in turn, facilitated extremely low wages for Southern white industrial workers—part of their compensation was the fact that they were doing white men's work. Existence of a wage differential based on color constituted a constant reminder to the white worker that black labor was a potential threat to its security on the job, while it intensified the black worker's resentment toward his better-paid white competitor. This same differential also served as an effective impediment to organization of either white or black labor. Its continuation was assured by the disfranchisement of all Negroes and a large segment of the white population.

In the North the Negro was not a sizeable element in the labor market. The white worker became conscious of him, however, because of the cultural significance attached to color (rooted in the institution of American slavery), and the use of Negroes as strike-breakers. The latter prac-

tice weakened the labor movement at the same time that it created a wave of animosity toward the black worker in northern industrial centers. Negroes, who by tradition and early experience were, for the most part, anti-union, became more so as they were introduced in competition with whites.

The process was to be repeated in the instance of the Mexican in the United States. As Carey McWilliams has observed: "By keeping Mexicans segregated occupationally, employers have created a situation in which the skilled labor groups have naturally regarded the Mexicans as *group* competitors rather than as individual employees.... In some areas, as in west Texas, it is also apparent that the use which has been made of Mexican labor has tended to drive out Anglo-American small farmers and tenants.... While the conflict has always been economic, it has consistently been rationalized as racial or cultural in character."

Just as a wage and occupational differential based on color had its roots in the economic interests of a small minority of whites in the South, so residential segregation in the North had its real and sophisticated champions in a small group of property owners, real estate operators, and land speculators. In the South, the mass of whites soon confused their own economic ills with a dark scapegoat. So in the North, the mass of whites confused their problems of property values, inadequate housing, and urban decay with a racial issue.

Residential segregation pays off in terms of artificially high rents and selling prices. It sustains real estate on which, were there a free market, revenue and values would decline. It permits operators in the Negro, Mexican, or Chinese ghetto to ignore competitive occupancy and maintenance standards. Equally important, residential segrega-

tion is a feature in the sales appeal of exclusive residential areas; increasingly it is becoming a part of salesmanship in most urban real estate.

III.

The importance attached to color in the United States has its historical roots in slavery and its aftermath. These institutions were established long ago by the then dominant economic control groups in the South. The attitudes and patterns that resulted have, in turn, been perpetuated by a large element in the population.

To understand the tenacity of discrimination in the United States, one must comprehend the implications of a mobile, competitive, predominantly middle class society. Much attention has been paid to the competitive nature of our culture, but social and economic mobility have less frequently been associated with social change. While it is generally recognized that fear of downward movement is important in creating susceptibility to prejudice against minority groups, less attention has been given to the effects of upward mobility upon the *actions* of individuals and groups in situation where variations in social patterns are involved. Our social arrangements, because they involve and create insecurity incident to social position, join economic insecurity in producing individuals who feel the need of a scapegoat. This fact alone, however, does not explain why other societies with large racial minorities and economic insecurity have not developed a comparable color line.

In the United States a large segment of the population is dedicated to improving its economic and social status. People so inspired adopt peculiar behavior and acquire unique needs. They constantly seek contacts that will enhance their chances of arrival into a higher economic or social group. This involves participation in a social set that has standing or belonging to a desirable club. It is reflected

in changing affiliation to a more prestige-laden church and attempts to get children into schools where social contacts will be helpful in accelerating their mobility. One of its most striking expressions is the urge to move into an exclusive neighborhood.

Such activity encourages conformity with what seems to be accepted norms of behavior. Group exclusiveness and acceptance of discrimination against minorities, as well as existing attitudes toward economic and social problems, can be and are easily emulated in this social setting. The culture places few impediments upon their expression, while offering rewards for their acceptance; consequently social and economic pressures constantly influence and often determine individuals' acceptance toward the groups involved. These same pressures, of course, serve to modify and mold attitudes.

356

Analysis of the American scene suggests that the combination of social mobility (itself an attribute of our economic system) and economic instability (with resulting competition for jobs among the working elements and general uncertainty for most elements in the nation) has been important in maintaining the color line. Despite a tradition of Negro slavery and large non-white populations, Brazil and Puerto Rico have not established similar color attitudes and patterns. Charles Rolger's description of the Puerto Rican situation is instructive:

Questions of status are of slight importance to a class of people whose economic condition has for generations remained on a subsistence level, and whose folkways, attitudes, moral and religious values are so closely woven into this subsistence economy as to produce a comparatively well-organized person. This condition tends to produce a class whose wishes lie close to reality. Forces which produce competition, social differentiation, conflict, and struggle for status are constrained by this traditional social inertia.

In the lower class [in Puerto Rico] where the only "stable" factor is economic insecurity, where slight advantages in economic status continuously shift from person to person, and where mutual aid is a survival expedient, there is neither need of nor any process to produce any socially differentiated set of traditional status-producing values. Dominance and subordination on any basis are out of character within a comparatively isolated class whose activities are organized around the elemental process of satisfying basic human needs. Such conditions do not nurture fears that Negroes will displace whites. Fear that the Negro will achieve equal or higher status is of little consequence when status and values that produce it are incidental and transitory....

The low standards of living and absence of a large middle class in Puerto Rico and Brazil are consequences of the economic orders in these two areas. Under such conditions, there have been few advantages to dominant economic control groups involved in perpetuating a color bar. There had been, prior to the penetration of values dominant in the United States, few social or economic advantages for individuals who displayed pronounced color consciousness. In

both places, some of the mixed bloods had long augmented the ranks of the dominant European strains in exploiting the mass of the population of all racial backgrounds.

IV.

In any society, there are those who, because of power or prestige, or both, establish values and patterns of behavior for others. These values and patterns, while not always wholly acceptable, do exert enormous influence, becoming often in the course of time the accepted norms around which the society tends to evolve. Frequently they are based on myths, and repeatedly they have been slogans or by-words which are accepted without critical analysis. Just as there are positive values, so there are negative ones. Certain types of behavior are rewarded; others are penalized. This is equally true of democratic capitalism or totalitarian Communism. AND MOST OF THE VALUES COME FROM THE TOP BE IT DOMINATED BY THE RULING FAMILIES OR THE PARTY.

Social change, therefore, is related to power. When the rate of change is slow, it is reflected in slight shifts in power controls; when there are rapid changes in power relations, social change is most pronounced. A major economic depression, a world war, or a cold war of idealogies involves revolutionary changes in the thinking of a people. To a slightly lesser degree, they occasion ideological and institutional changes. The latter, in turn, breed shifts in power controls. Recent events in the United States illustrate the process.

As a consequence of the Great Depression, the social reforms of the New Deal, the fact of full employment during the war and high levels of employment in the post-war period, the people of this nation are convinced that depressions are man-made and subject to control. They demand, therefore, that government take action to prevent serious unemployment and cushion against the insecurities of a

laissez faire economy. We, as a nation are committed to attempt to secure sustained high levels of employment. This involves a major change in the conception of the role of government in the economic life of the nation, even though there is far from agreement as to the means through which our new goal is to be achieved and despite the fact that the concept of public action to assure high levels of employment is constantly being sniped at.

Such a reversal in traditional attitudes has not come about without involving many other changes. One of the most outstanding has been the new position of labor in the nation. Over three-quarters of the persons working in the United States today are employees, most of whom expect to remain on the payroll of someone else. As a consequence, forty per cent of the non-supervisory and non-technical workers in private industries are organized in trade unions which now have over 14,000,000 members. During the last war labor unions not only increased their numerical and economic strength, but they also became a major political force. As Professor Slichter has noted:

The American economy is a laboristic economy, or at least is rapidly becoming one. By this I mean that employees are the most influential group in the community and that the economy is run in their interest more than in the interest of any other economic group. A community composed almost entirely of employees must be expected to have its own distinctive culture — its own industrial institutions, its own public policies, and its own jurisprudence. The fact that employees are supplementing business men as the most influential group in the community means that far-reaching changes are impending in the civilization of the United States.

While this is probably an overstatement, it does indicate a direction in American life. It also reflects accurately the intensity, if not the results, of modifications that are occurring on the economic front.

With an economy of high levels of employment, a stronger labor movement and labor participation in political activity to an unheard of extent, there have been sig-

nificant changes on the human relations front. The economic, political and moral necessities of war production required introduction of non-white workers into new occupations and industries. Because of the economic climate in which these changes in the color occupational pattern occurred, their intensity was great. At the same time, the relationship of minorities to labor unions was greatly altered during the war. As contrasted to the almost universal fear of non-white labor as a threat to organized workers in World War I, during World War II most of the leadership and much of the rank and file of industrial unions, many of which were born during the New Deal years, either took the lead in facilitating wider utilization of minorities or cooperated in governmental programs to accomplish the result. Even those unions, the older craft ones for the most part, that opposed employment or upgrading of non-whites vigorously had little real basis for fear of colored workers as potential strike-breakers. Their opposition was at that time the result of deep concern for the future when they believed there would not be enough work to go around, and, thus, expression of craft unions' traditional attempt to control and limit the supply of labor as a means of offsetting chronic unemployment for their membership. In other instances, it reflected a residuum of race prejudice inherited from an era of strike-breaking or unemployment, or both.

As Negroes continued to cluster in industrial centers in response to the labor demands of war production, they entered organized labor, so that today about a million colored Americans are dues' paying members. The Negro community no longer remained anti-union, but it and its working members accepted labor organization about the same as their prototypes in the majority group. In this setting it was natural that minorities responded to labor's bid for political power. But most important, labor's new role

in American Life has meant increasing strength and grow-
ing prestige for a new element in the power relations in
the nation. This new source of real power has, in its pro-
gressive branches, rejected the dictates of color-caste, es-
tablishing patterns and supporting programs to discredit
and destroy the color line.

Wherever there is a strong, liberal labor movement, op-
portunities for pitting race against race as a means of
depressing wages, discouraging mass organization of
workers, or rendering the labor force more pliable are re-
duced. Attempts to do so not only encounter the threat of
increasing economic and legislative barriers but, in pres-
ent day America, they become significant events in the
shifting power relationships between labor and capital, ac-
celerating the wide-spread identification of white and black
workers with organized labor as a political force.

If current trends continue, two private groups—labor and business—will share power with government in our economy. With the passage of time, the influence of labor will grow, but, as long as a large segment of production and distribution is in the ownership and under the control of private enterprise, business leadership will continue to affect values, behavior and institutions. Review of the economic interests of this control group reveals that if it is possible to secure economic stability in a predominantly free enterprise system during this phase of American history, dedication to and real acceptance of that goal by business leadership will reduce materially the economic motivation for support of the color line. Action to effect and assure high levels of employment will so alter power relationships as to weaken the prestige in discrimination, while, at the same time, new political alignments will result in institutional changes that will reduce the incidence of discrimination against minorities.

A nation in which labor, business and government are working to secure high levels of employment is in a much better position to make real its promise of equal opportunity than one that is beset with the fear or reality of severe economic depressions. Where there is expectation and realization of economic stability, the matter of minority groups' status can be taken out of the context of power rivalries on the economic front and promotion of better human relations need not necessarily evoke the open or concealed opposition of strong economic interests. Unless our economy is successful in meeting the problem of sustaining high levels of employment, it will not offer an environment favorable to those social changes which are required to make real the American Creed.

Robert Weaver is Rockefeller Professor, and staff member of the Center for Human Relations Studies at New York University School of Education. His appointment as executive head of the Opportunity Fellowships program of the Whitney Foundation has just been announced. He is widely known for his books on Negro labor and housing. He has been an administrator of both U. S. government and American Council on Race relations programs.

HUMAN RELATIONS: MID CENTURY

Edwin R. Embree

I.

At the mid-point of the Twentieth Century efforts in human relations have shifted from defense of special groups to a concern for a common democracy.

For generations the struggle in America was to provide facilities and advance the rights of specially disadvantaged groups: Negroes, recent immigrants, religious minorities, laborers, women. Today the emphasis is on the common advance of all the people. While we continue to battle for the rights of given groups wherever gross discriminations remain, we no longer feel it necessary—or even desirable—to work for special facilities for special groups, for example, housing for Negroes, special schools for recent immigrants, Jewish hospitals, special plots of garden homes for laborers, colleges for women. This may be too sweeping a statement. Certain of these special services may be needed for a time as the only means of assuring adequate opportunities for given segments of the population. And there may be continuing values in such special services as for example women's colleges, in order to nourish cultural needs of certain groups. But the major effort during the second half of the 20th Century is to see to it that all services—in education and health, in housing and recreation, in industry and labor, in every phase of life—are open to all on the basis of their individual qualifications. The advance during the next half century will be to enlarge and enrich these fully democratic public services so that we may develop a healthy, intelligent, cooperative, and prosperous commonweal.

Four notable features mark the new trend.

1. Society as a whole is taking responsibility for human

relations as a part of social welfare. In earlier days the aggressive agencies were pressure groups in behalf of various segments of the population: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Negro Urban League, the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League, Catholic protective societies, the friends of immigrants and friends of labor, the women's rights societies. Today the aggressive societies are the 300 state and local and national agencies devoted not to some special group but to the common rights and common opportunities of all.

This trend is shown not only in the general scope of the many private agencies, but even more strikingly by the moving in of government—state, local and national—to official concern for social health. This is a radically new feature of American public life. Starting with the Fair Employment Practices Committee of the Federal Government during the war years, official commissions have been established by a dozen states and by scores of cities. While few of these official commissions have yet anything like adequate powers or adequate budgets, they are the most striking public action toward the implementing of American democracy since the emancipation proclamation and the 13th and 14th amendments implemented the original bill of rights of the Constitution of the United States.

2. Concern for human relations has shifted from local quarrels to national policy and finally to world responsibility. For generations the South insisted that the race question was its private affair. For decades the Irish Catholics and German Jews of Boston acted as though their squabbles were a parochial quarrel. Until the second world war California claimed that the problems of Japanese Americans were its exclusive concern, and the states of the Southwest tried to fence in for their separate handling all questions concerning Mexican Americans.

Today all kinds of people are living all over the country. Over four million Negroes are in the North and West. There are almost as many Nisei living in Chicago as in Los Angeles; far more Japanese Americans in other parts of the country than in California. Jews and Catholics are not wholly concentrated in a few industrial centers, but are an integral part of the American population in every state and in every avenue of life. Human rights and human relations, we now see, can no longer be left to the play of special prejudices against special groups in special localities. At mid-century we begin to recognize that democracy, if it is to exist for any man anywhere, must exist for all men everywhere.

And finally after two world wars we are slowly coming to see that human relations is the crucial issue in world peace or world destruction. We begin to realize that not only the many groups here at home must get along together, but that the many diverse peoples of the earth must outgrow their jealousies and strife and find ways to live together and work together for a common prosperity.

3. The issues in human relations are moving from emotional good will or prejudice to intellectual research and intelligent action. Psychiatry is turning inquiry not only to the physical ills of Negroes but also to the mental ills of whites. Social studies are showing how all people may be happier by living and working in harmony than by keeping up the old jealousies and strifes. The hard facts of economics are pointing out that prosperity in our present interdependent society depends on using to the fullest the labor and talents of all. Labor unions, finding that a united front of all workers is necessary for success, are doing away with the old barriers of creed and color not so much out of good will as out of good policy. Business and industry similarly are finding that skills are valuable wherever they may be found and that

the wider the purchasing power the greater the prosperity. Enlightened selfishness, slowly but steadily, is taking the place of the crasser forms of selfishness involved in discrimination; enlightened research is taking the place of blind prejudice.

4. With the recognition that human relations is the issue between world peace and world destruction we are beginning to realize that cooperation must be the pattern rather than standardization. For thousands of years men tried to make other people over into their own image. Wars of conquest subjugated neighboring tribes and neighboring nations and tried to impose on wider and wider empires the pattern of the conquering group. In America the early idea was the melting pot: the molding of all our people into a common type even a common physical image. Slowly we are beginning to realize that diversity need not divide but may enrich and strengthen a common society. Peoples may contribute from their various talents and various cultures to produce a common store of spiritual and material riches. Democracy, we are beginning to see, does not mean leveling everybody down to the lowest average or molding everyone into a standard image, but giving opportunity for the highest talent in each individual and each group of individuals to come to its fullest stature. We are recognizing, for example, that various religions, far from being in necessary conflict, are manifold ways of giving expression to our spiritual aspirations. We are even recognizing that women and men may have equal rights without losing their distinctive natures.

It is true that nationalism still rages, that religions still quarrel, that each segment of mankind still clings to the hope that it can be the master race, that apostles of different economic systems are bitterly striving to impose their ideologies and their will on the whole world. Nevertheless thoughtful men in America and India, in England and

Africa, and thoughtful men I am sure in Russia, begin to realize that it is not standardization that is needed for the peace and prosperity of the world, but cooperation among diverse peoples and diverse cultures.

II.

There is some necessary conflict between the equal rights and opportunities of individuals on the one hand and the acceptance of differing social orders on the other, for different cultures stress different balances between individual liberty and group security.

In America, for example, liberals have centered their efforts on personal freedom. This is in the tradition of the Magna Carta and the persistent Anglo Saxon struggle for the rights of man. It is also rooted in the ancient Greek culture which has so greatly influenced western civilization and in the ideals of Judaism and Christianity. It is further strengthened by our capitalistic economy with its emphasis on private initiative and free enterprise.

But many other cultures have put their stress on the well being of the total state. The Inca Empire in early America achieved probably the highest standard of living of any of the American Indian peoples through state planning, a severe and rigorous division of labor, and a stern regimentation of the people. In modern times state control has been strongly marked in Germany and Japan and most strikingly today in Soviet Russia.

In every society there must be some balance between freedom and security. Even in liberty loving America we recognize the claims of the group over the individual in a thousand relationships. In a trade union, for example, each worker surrenders a great deal of his personal freedom in order that by regimented action the group may advance with ultimate benefit to each individual in the union. Even in so simple a unit as the family, the freedom of each member is constantly curbed if the family is to prosper or even

to survive. Yet security is a mockery unless there is a modicum of freedom. Probably the greatest security exists in a state of slavery. The slave has no personal responsibilities. His subsistence as well as his labor is the concern of his master. Yet few men can be found who will voluntarily pay the price of slavery for the boon of security.

In earlier times it was possible for each region to work out its own relationship between the individual and the group without much regard for the opinions or customs of other people. In the present closely interdependent world this is not so easy. As Abraham Lincoln saw for one nation, so we are beginning to see for humanity as a whole that One World cannot exist half free and half slave. Yet we also recognize that groups have rights as well as individuals. Free enterprise in trying out new forms of social relations and economic systems may be as fruitful among nations as private initiative is among individuals.

We need not expect a flat uniformity throughout the world. We do have a right to demand that a measure of freedom be guaranteed to all men everywhere. This is the aim of such instruments as the universal bill of rights drawn up by the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations. At the same time, if we are to maintain world peace by democratic methods, we must recognize the rights of various regions to work out their own ideas of social organization. It is in this spirit of cooperation that the United Nations has been established.

Human relations present a complex set of patterns. No one ever claimed that the problems of democracy were simple or easy. At this mid-point of the Twentieth Century these problems are receiving fresh and intelligent attention as they press upon us with compelling force. The momentous issue of the second half of this century in America and throughout the world is the struggle for good human relations, the constant search to find ways to guarantee

basic rights and rich opportunities to every individual and at the same time to guarantee as much security as possible to all individuals through proper organization for the commonweal.

This means that education—in its broadest sense and including both research and teaching—is a greater force today than ever before in man's history. These huge and delicate human problems can never be solved by war and violence. They will be solved only by the wisdom that grows with an education which is both broad and deep. They will be solved by developing, ever more fully and richly, the constructive powers of individuals and nations so that they may live and let live within the broad frame of cooperation.

Edwin R. Embree is a consultant to foundations and institutions, his major client being the New John Hay Whitney Foundation. He is staff consultant to the Center for Human Relations Studies. From its inception to its conclusion he was President of the Julius Rosenwald Fund in Chicago, and has been an officer of the Rockefeller Foundation and of Yale University. He is author of many books on peoples and cultures. His recent article, "Timid Billions" in Harpers Magazine dealt with the need for venture financing in the public interest of human relations and teacher education.

"a relational approach rather than piece-meal knowl-edge."

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In this book Professor Kaplan gives us a keen critical analysis
of the current American Jewish scene together with his program
for the future. He maintains that we must synthesize Judaism and
Americanism and reconstruct Jewish community life by divesting
Jewish tradition of those elements which are inconsistent with our
sense of justice. Our traditional narrative he claims has two facets
to it, legend and history, with legend predominent in the earlier
narratives of the Bible and history in the later narratives. Professor
Kaplan insists that the Jewish people must maintain their identity.
At the same time if they expect really to live they must share in the
enlightening spirit of our time and justify its existence as a separate
group by the contribution to truth and leadership which it may make
to the common whole of society. How to achieve it and what it
should contribute is the substance of the book. Aware of the fact
that anti-Jewish feeling affected greatly Jewish life and thinking,
the author discusses the role of a Jewish homeland in the nations of
the world. He points out that the Jews in Diaspora will have to
continue to give moral, political, material and physical support to
Eretz Israel and it will in turn benefit by the survival of a national
and cultural life. To him the great achievement of the pioneers in
the Holy Land, their marvelous success in making the Hebrew
tongue a living and dynamic language and the potentialities of the
new state for the future of a world Jewish religious culture, makes
Israel important for Jewish survival but it must be clearly under-
stood that "Jews in the dispersion owe exclusive political allegiance
to the countries in which they reside."

This reviewer believes that Professor Kaplan errs in the state-
ment that Judaism is "an eternal and unchangeable system of doctrine
and law." The whole gamut of Jewish law and letters, its growth
and development through the Bible, Mishna, Talmud, Responsa and
secular literature shows to the contrary that Judaism is dynamic
and flexible. He is clearly in error in his conjectures on the "status
of the Jewish woman in Jewish law." The Bible and Jewish litera-
ture are replete with statements granting the woman equal rights
with man. Exegetical literature negates his interpretations regard-
ing women.

Proponents of interfaith relations will be interested in the author's
following two proposals for religious pluralism. He advocates that

374

the traditional attitudes of Christians and Jews towards other religions, be drastically revised in the interest of democracy, peace and good-will. He states that the traditional Jewish belief in Israel as a Chosen People is objectionable from the point of view that all religions are equally near to "all who call upon Him in truth." Therefore, says Dr. Kaplan, we must eliminate from our liturgy all reference to Israel as an elected people. He also maintains that the Christian doctrine that the Jews are a damned and rejected people must also be discarded and eliminated. The Church has nothing to lose and a great deal to gain by making this revision, for it would be relieved of its terrible burden of guilt for the hatred against Jews. "It is unfortunately true that in the Christian religious tradition the Jews are assumed to be the accursed of God. There is no use evading the fact, or prevaricating about it. There is only one way to deal with it; it must cease to be fact. That judgment on the Jews must be expunged from the Christian tradition."

The book is challenging and thought-provoking. Professor Kaplan's views may not always seem readily acceptable, but they impress the reader with their fortitude, integrity and clear-thinking.

<div style="text-align:right">Abraham I. Katsh</div>

Introduction to the History of Sociology, Harry Elmer Barnes, Editor, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948.

The editor of a history of sociology faces the same problem that any anthologist faces namely, the difficult problem of selection. To be all things to all students and scholars and yet maintain a discriminating discretion in selection is a task which would have stumped a lesser encyclopedist than Harry Elmer Barnes.

After two introductory chapters, "Ancient and Medieval Social Philosophy" and "Social Thought In Early Modern Times" which serve as a background against which to interpret man's attempt to construct a definite science of sociology, there follows a discussion and appraisal of the works such eminent pioneers of a systematic sociology as Comte, Spencer, Morgan, Sumner, Ward and Gumplowicz.

There follows then a fascinating and interesting panorama of the great names and works of sociology arranged in groups by country and language. "Leading Sociologists in Germanic Countries", includes such names as Wundt, Tonnies, Simmel, Max Weber and Werner Sombart; "European Sociology in non-Germanic countries"

with chapters on the works of two Russian sociologists, Novicow and Kovalesky; "Main Tendencies In French Sociology" include such men as Tarde, LeBon, and Durkheim. In a single chapter and with somewhat less success the Italians, Pareto, Loria, Vaccaro, Gini and Sighele are discussed. The lone Spanish sociologist is Adolfo Posada. "English sociologists since Herbert Spencer" include Kidd, Hobhouse, Westermarck, Briffault, Wallas, and because of the tremendous interest created by "A Study of History,' Toymbee's contribution to social thought is reviewed. "Sociological theory in America" concludes the book with an impressive list of American sociologists, Giddings, Small, Thomas, Stuckenberg, Ross, Cooley, Ellwood, Hayes, and Sorokin. The single sociologist from South America included is Cornejo.

The detailed listing of the main sections of the book and the sociologists whose works are analyzed is designed to show the vast scope of this fine work. For the student of sociology however, there will be many names that come to mind which seemingly point to an incomplete treatment of the subject. For instance the German, Albert Schaeffle 1831 to 1903, the Russian Paul Von Lilienfeld 1829-1903, the Frenchman Frederic LePlay, and the American George Mead may appear as important omissions to some but as Dr. Barnes indicates his task was to write of those who had produced systems of sociology not of those sociologists who had restricted their writings to some specialized field. To this reviewer he has succeeded in writing a monumental history of systematc sociology.

Of the sociologists reviewed original works and critical commentaries are quoted fully enough to give the reader a definitive summary of the system of sociology developed by each of them. Each main division of the book is prefaced by an introductory note in which Dr. Barnes gives a brief survey of the various schools of writing in that country.

Dr. Barnes and the twenty-five other contributors to this volume deserve much praise and credit for the masterly way in which they have reviewed man's attempt through 3000 years to understand the origin of human society, the ways of group life, the development and expression of social interest, the modes of social discipline and social control, and the main causes of both cultural lag and social progress.

<div style="text-align: right">Edward J. Kunzer</div>

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